December 29, 2020
As 2020 is drawing to a close and research analysts are
formulating views for the next year, we take this opportunity to compile an
anthology that brings together projections made by our research teams covering
various industries and aggregate fields, including macro economy, market
strategy, fixed income, and commodities. We hope this almost 116,000-word book can
serve as a useful reference for investors. The constant theme in our investment
strategies for 2021 is the analysis of economic cycles to forecast their next
phase. A new factor that has to be taken into account is COVID-19, as it has
temporarily altered the driving mechanism of economic cycles.
Generally speaking, the key driver behind economic cycles is
demand fluctuation triggered by changes in inflation and debt. An excessive increase
in inflation implies the economy is overheated, which induces policy tightening
and leads to a subsequent fall in demand. When deflation replaces inflation as
the main risk, the government may adopt expansionary policies again, resulting
in a demand recovery. On the other hand, excessive debt may give rise to asset
bubbles and financial risks, prompting the government to strengthen
macro-prudential management. As a result, credit tightens, asset prices fall,
and demand declines. However, subsequent re-adoption of expansionary policies
may provide the economy with new momentum to enter another upward cycle.
However, the economic cycle under the impact of COVID-19 is
quite different from the two typical endogenous cycles described above.
COVID-19 constrains aggregate labor supply as it is a highly contagious disease
with a relatively high mortality rate. Therefore, the pandemic’s initial impact
on the economy was a devastating external shock on the supply side, undermining
labor income and then weighing on demand. When the pandemic subsides, its
physical constraints on economic activities would fade away, leading to the
recovery of production and supply, the rebound of employment and income, as
well as an increase in demand.
The unusual economic cycle driven by exogenous supply shocks
still underlies our thoughts on the economic outlook, macro policies and asset
allocation strategies for 2021. However, we believe a key difference in 2021
will be an increase in endogenous forces, which include not only the supply
recovery’s boost to and multiplier effects on demand, but also the lagged
effect of government policies adopted in 2020 to cope with the COVID-19 outbreak.
Under this framework, we will discuss how the “disconnect” between financial
markets and the real economy will evolve going forward, as well as its
implications for investment strategies. We believe three issues merit special
attention.
I. Maintaining supply or demand?
China and the US’s different routes to economic recovery
The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 confronts humanity with a
fundamental question: Can we put a price on human life? As the pandemic wreaks
havoc around the world, we have seen a tradeoff between the value of human
lives and economic interests from the society's perspective as a whole. Life is
invaluable from a personal perspective, but the social value of life can be
calculated. When COVID-19 spreads like wildfire, the quantity of labor that
workers are willing to provide declines regardless of labor price. Mechanisms
of price and market fail completely under extreme conditions, such as a total
lockdown. Given the strong externalities of individual activities, the
government should intervene to safeguard public interests. A critical issue for
the government, however, is how to intervene.
Looking at various governments’ responses to the COVID-19
outbreak, we see clear differences between China’s approach and that taken by
US and Europe. Different government actions have produced different results. As
the first country in the world to identify the COVID-19 virus, China faced
difficulties at first as it had no experience in dealing with the new pathogen.
However, the Chinese government took decisive, unprecedented action to lock
down a mega city with more than 10mn residents, and mobilized the whole country
to impose quarantine measures. While these measures resulted in enormous
short-term costs to the economy, they have protected human lives to the largest
extent. From an economic perspective, protection of human lives is equivalent
to protecting aggregate supply capacity, reducing expected infection rates and
mortality rates, and mitigating the pandemic's impacts on aggregate supply. As
China effectively brought the pandemic under control, production activities
have resumed at an accelerated pace in China, and the country’s economic
recovery has been the fastest among the world’s major economies.
The focus of government intervention in developed economies,
such as Europe and the US, is markedly different from that of China. Although
Europe and the US also took quarantine measures at an early stage, these
measures were much less stringent than restrictions imposed in China. As a result,
the pandemic lingered on and rebounded in Europe and the US. A second wave of
COVID-19 outbreak hit the US in 3Q20 and Europe in 4Q20, impeding the recovery
of supply capacity. However, Europe and the US provided unprecedented financial
relief to cope with the pandemic. A key measure to support such financial
relief programs is the monetization of fiscal deficit. Thanks to generous
financial relief, consumer demand has remained relatively strong in these
economies.
Should the government choose to maintain supply or demand?
Both options have pros and cons. Policymakers in the US seem to believe that
benefits from sustained economic growth can eventually offset, or even exceed,
economic losses caused by the climbing death toll, as long as the aggregate
demand stimulus is strong enough and economic growth is rapid enough. However,
the reality is that China’s supply-maintaining policies have effectively
protected both the economy and human lives despite initial economic losses. In
contrast, resurgence of the pandemic forced major European economies to
re-impose extensive lockdowns and social distancing measures, which led to
another round of financial market fluctuations and threatened to derail the
economic recovery.
How to explain the difference in policy results? The
multiplier effect of supply shocks may shed some light. In endogenous economic
cycles, supply cannot automatically create demand due to the three fundamental
psychological laws mentioned by John Maynard Keynes or the problem of unfair
distribution highlighted by Karl Marx. In other words, Say’s Law does not work
and there is no automatic transmission mechanism between aggregate demand and
aggregate supply in endogenous economic cycles. However, the economic cycle
amid COVID-19 is primarily driven by exogenous shocks rather than endogenous
imbalance. In such an unusual economic cycle, supply does create demand to some
extent. This is the root cause of the multiplier effect of supply shocks.
The magnitude of the multiplier effect is determined by the
length of supply shocks. If the shock is one-off or very brief, it is possible
to break the vicious cycle between falling supply and shrinking demand by
boosting aggregate demand. However, things are different when the supply shock
is protracted or repeated, as intertemporal and cross-product substitution
would magnify the negative multiplier effect on the supply side.
For example, when a sector is hit by a supply shock and
suffers from unemployment, it is possible to stimulate demand to create a new
sector that absorbs the unemployed and mitigates the multiplier effect of the
supply shock. However, if the pandemic persists, the new sector's production
and employment capacity would face significant supply-side constraints. As for
intertemporal substitution, people’s willingness to consume may not rise much
amid the lingering pandemic. In addition, the protracted pandemic also reduces
the effectiveness of measures to alleviate forced savings, such as shopping
vouchers.
Therefore, policy intervention that aims to maintain demand
would be more effective only if the pandemic is short-lived. Unfortunately,
COVID-19’s unusually high infectiousness will probably cause multiple waves of
outbreak. Before effective vaccines become available, the number of new
COVID-19 cases may rise exponentially if policymakers fail to make a quick
decision as they ponder over the tradeoff between the economic cost of
quarantine measures and the value of human lives threatened by the pandemic.
When the accumulated number of COVID-19 cases reaches a certain threshold, the
healthcare system may collapse again, pulling the whole country back into a
massive lockdown. If policymakers attempt to minimize economic losses resulting
from quarantine measures by sacrificing human lives, they will probably end up
losing both human lives and the economic recovery, in our view.
Looking ahead, our macro team expects effective vaccines to
become available in early 2021, implying that the effect of demand-maintaining
policies may gradually become more visible. More importantly, effective
vaccines may turn the negative supply-side multiplier into a positive one.
Under impacts from COVID-19, the driver of economic cycles is on the supply
side. A positive multiplier effect on the supply side means recovering supply
would automatically create demand. For example, workers would have stronger
motives to get new jobs or return to their original jobs when the pandemic
subsides. An increase in household income would generate additional demand.
Moreover, consumption postponed amid the pandemic no longer needs to be delayed
when the pandemic fades away. We may even see compensatory intertemporal
substitution, i.e. increased consumption in advance to compensate for
consumption postponed due to the pandemic.
We believe economies around the world may recover concurrently
in 2021 thanks to the multiplier effect of supply-side recovery and the lagged
effect of demand stimulus introduced earlier. How strong will the recovery be
and how long will it last? As the pandemic’s exogenous shock to the economy
subsides, endogenous forces return as the primary driver of the economic cycle.
Therefore, we should revert to the traditional theoretical framework of
economic cycles to analyze hindrances to the economic recovery, namely debt and
inflation risks.
II. Hindrances
to recovery: Inflation or debt?
As discussed above, inflation and debt are the main triggers
of endogenous economic cycles. As a matter of fact, inflation and debt are not
independent of each other. Instead, the two factors are very likely to affect
each other and result in a downturn of the debt cycle. We believe that China,
the US and even emerging economies may face the risk of a debt cycle downturn
in 2021.
To mitigate impacts from COVID-19, the US government has
provided four rounds of fiscal relief, including higher unemployment benefits
and direct cash payment to residents. The total amount of these relief packages
reached US$3trn, or 14% of the country’s 2019 GDP. The unusual fiscal expansion
was backed by the Federal Reserve’s unprecedented unlimited QE, and a
skyrocketing M2 growth rate second only to the peak recorded during World War
II. The super-easing of monetary policy, especially the monetization of fiscal
deficits, have led to a rather abnormal economic phenomenon: Although 20mn
Americans were jobless, the US’s household disposable income actually increased
and effectively supported a consumption recovery.
The US’s fiscal deficit monetization is no doubt successful in
maintaining demand. As fiscal deficit is essentially government debt
denominated in the domestic currency, we believe the sustainability of the US’s
fiscal deficit depends primarily on the country’s inflation rate. Most people,
including policymakers at the Federal Reserve, believe that the US does not
face the risk of a sharp upsurge in inflation. Therefore, the Fed has shifted
its inflation management approach from the “target inflation” system, which has
been in effect for decades, to an “average inflation targeting” framework. The
shift signals that the Fed gives priority to employment and does not worry
about inflation.
The Federal Reserve’s recent moves are reminiscent of its
policy stance shortly after the Second World War. According to Fed Research
Director Emanuel Goldenweiser (1883–1953), policymakers at the central bank
believed that “a much more serious and lasting problem... will be the problem
of finding jobs for people released from the services and from war
industries."[1] In
spite of the exceedingly strong money supply growth during the war, most people
believed that the main challenge after the war was deflation and recession
rather than inflation. They argued that “the wartime accumulation of liquidity
was… providing a highly desirable source of postwar purchasing power. The sole
role assigned to monetary policy was to keep interest rates low.”[2] If we replace the word “war” with “pandemic”, these claims and arguments are
quite similar to the logic behind the Fed’s switch to the “average inflation
targeting“ framework.
In A Monetary History of
the United States, 1867–1960, Milton Friedman provided insightful comments
on what happened next: “Events belied expectations. Country after country was
bedeviled by inflation”[3].
“The combination of uncertainty on the part of the monetary authorities about
their role and about the consequences of their actions, together with unmatched
public attention to the course of economic events... induced a tendency to move
slowly in either direction”[4].
According to Friedman, the effect of monetary policies often lagged behind their
implementation, but the lag and its results were often neglected and hence
accumulated over time. When the accumulated results became visible in the form
of rising prices, the Federal Reserve was forced to reduce the growth rate of
money stock[5].
While the above analysis does not necessarily mean that
inflation in the US will skyrocket in 2021, we should not ignore the risk of a
stronger-than-expected rise in the inflation rate due to accelerated economic
recovery, as effective vaccines are quite likely to become available in early
2021. Rising inflation may expose debt problems in the US, and signs of this
risk might have already emerged. Along with the monetization of fiscal
deficits, the US dollar index has depreciated, pushing up import prices. If the
US’s economic recovery surprises the market on the upside and the expectation
for inflation picks up, the rise of long-term interest rates in the US may also
beat market expectations. This may expose debt risks and drive up financial
market fluctuations in emerging market economies with large amounts of debt denominated
in the US dollar.
If the US’s yield curve steepens in 2021, a direct impact on
China might be the narrowing of the interest rate spread between the two
countries, which may dampen the momentum of money flows into China. Even if the
US's rising inflation rate does not exceed market expectations, we still think
that the renminbi exchange rate's strong performance in 2020 may not continue
in the next year. The depreciation pressure results from a possible weakening
of China’s terms of trade, as the availability of effective vaccines would
accelerate the recovery of production capacities in foreign countries.
It is worth noting that China’s private sector, just like
other emerging economies, is a net borrower of foreign debts. Currency
depreciation means credit tightening for industries with large amounts of
foreign debt, such as real estate. Therefore, real estate investment may lose
steam in 2021 despite gaining strong momentum in 2020. Adverse currency
movements may expose debt problems in the real estate industry in 2021.
In fact, real estate is not the only sector that may face debt
risks in 2021. China launched large-scale monetary expansion in 2020 to combat
COVID-19. From the perspective of assets in the banking system, the monetary
expansion was achieved primarily by raising the financial leverage of
non-government sectors. Our macro team found that the corporate sector’s
debt-service burden rebounds 4–6 quarters after large-scale credit expansion.
The increased debt-service burden, in turn, may result in credit tightening.
Our macro team also estimated that the private sector’s debt-service burden in
the current debt cycle is higher than in the previous three cycles. In
addition, the ratio of principal/interest repayment to new credit seems to have
bottomed out recently.
Generally speaking, borrowers may spend less and save more to
cope with the rising debt-service burden. However, aggregate demand may shrink
if a large number of borrowers cut spending to repay debts, as lenders usually
have a lower marginal propensity to spend than borrowers. On the other hand,
borrowers may also sell assets to repay debts, but asset prices may plunge if a
large number of borrowers do so. Even if borrowers’ assets are insufficient to
cover debts, they may still avoid a default through financing from external
sources. However, falling net assets and deteriorating debt-service ability may
result in stricter conditions for refinancing. For example, lenders may ask for
higher risk premiums or even require additional collateral for existing debts.
In a nutshell, debt sustainability may deteriorate if a large
number of borrowers cut spending or sell assets to repay debts, resulting in a
vicious cycle that will eventually cause defaults, in our view. When a large
number of defaults occur, lenders may require higher risk premiums and
financing conditions may tighten, leading to financial market fluctuations and contractions
in the real economy.
III. Investment strategy:
Continue to overweight general-purpose assets or invest more in specific-purpose
assets?
Our macro team’s view on debt risks in 2021 is largely
consistent with our fixed income team’s concern about a rising risk premium next
year, which is negative for asset allocation to corporate bonds. From a more
general perspective on asset allocation, we saw that performance of financial
assets and the real economy diverged in both China and the US this year. As of
October 30, the total capitalization of the US stock market rose 4.7%, the
S&P 500 Index grew 1.2%, and the NASDAQ Index increased 22%. Meanwhile, the
A-share market’s total capitalization grew 21%, the CSI 300 Index gained 15%,
and the ChiNext Index surged as much as 48%. In contrast to the bullish stock
markets, recovery of the real economy remained lackluster in both China and the
US.
How to explain the sharp divergence? We think it might be
attributable to an increase in people’s expectations for future uncertainties due
to the COVID-19 pandemic. When uncertainties rise, people prefer assets with
low specificity (“general-purpose assets”) to those with high specificity
(“specific-purpose assets”)[6].
Cash has the lowest specificity as it can be easily converted into other assets
at any moment. Financial assets have the second lowest specificity. Although
financial assets are backed by physical assets for production purposes,
securitization can give financial assets higher liquidity and lower specificity
than underlying physical assets. Non-production physical assets, such as land
and housing, have lower liquidity and higher specificity than financial assets,
but their specificity is lower than other physical assets, such as industrial
plants and machinery. Physical assets for production purposes have the highest
specificity and poor liquidity, as it is quite costly to adapt these assets to
other purposes.
Investors’ preference for general-purpose or specific-purpose
assets changes along with uncertainties in the economy. Uncertainties were at
their highest in March, when COVID-19 spread rapidly across the world and
governments responded with extensive lockdowns. As a result, investors
preferred cash as it has the lowest specificity, and prices of almost all other
assets fell. However, economic uncertainties declined thanks to government
intervention to mitigate impacts from COVID-19. This led to the rebound in stock
prices, as stocks have relatively higher specificity than cash. Economic
uncertainties further declined as the age distribution of COVID-19 deaths
became increasingly clear. Hence, stock markets rebounded at an accelerated
pace, and prices also began to rise for real estate, a physical asset with
relatively low specificity.
As COVID-19 is still wreaking havoc around the world, the
economic recovery still faces significant uncertainties, and there is no sign
of a substantial increase in investors’ preference for specific-purpose assets.
We compared our strategy and sector teams’ 2021 outlook reports with their 2020
views, and found that they have become more optimistic on cyclical sectors
(e.g. commodities and banking) and the relatively cyclical consumer
discretionary sector. However, analysts have become more cautious on the 2021
outlook of the relatively defensive consumer staples sector. These sector views
are based on an implicit assumption that the recovery will continue, i.e.
effective vaccines will be available in early 2021, further reducing economic
uncertainties. This implies possible changes in investors’ current strategy of
overweighting general-purpose assets and underweighting specific-purpose
assets.
As a global catastrophe for the entire human race, COVID-19
shattered many conventional beliefs about economies, government policies and
asset allocation in 2020. Looking ahead, we expect the pandemic’s exogenous
impacts to gradually subside in 2021. The multiplier effect of demand-creation
by supply may drive the economy back to the trajectory of endogenous cycles.
Debt and inflation may again become main triggers of economic cycles, implying
that the asset allocation strategy for 2021 may also change. In this preface,
we provide initial thoughts under our base-case assumptions. More detailed
analyses, investment strategies and risk alerts are available in the rest of
this report.
For
more details, please see our report Economic and financial cycles to converge in 2021 published in December 2020.
[1] Milton Friedman & Anna Jacobson Schwartz: A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960, Copyright 1963 by National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press
[2] The same as foot note 1
[3] The same as foot note 1
[4] The same as foot note 1
[5] The same as foot note 1
[6] In economics theory, asset specificity means the degree to which an asset can be used only in specific areas or under specific circumstances. In this report, we define general-purpose assets as assets with low specificity, and specific-purpose assets as assets with high specificity.